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Abstract 
This research used a trait-based impression formation task to explore the effect of 
instructional set and opportunity for thought on inconsistency discounting. It was 
predicted that attitude polarization would be attenuated, regardless of opportunity for 
thought, when discounting incongruent information was difficult. When discounting 
incongruent information was easy, attitude polarization was expected to increase as 
opportunity for thought increased. The relationship between discounting and opportunity 
for thought was expected to be accentuated when individuals are low in tolerance for 
ambiguity. The results did not support these predictions. Explanations for the results are 
discussed and directions for future research are proposed. 
Self-Generated Attitude Change 
The Effect of Discounting on Self-Generated Attitude Change: 
A person by situation analysis 
When filling a position for a job, employers often have to assess various pieces of 
information about an applicant. By using multiple sources of information about 
applicants, personnel managers can evaluate a potential employee. On occasion, 
information from applications, resumes, references and interviews can be conflicting. 
For example, one letter of reference can describe the applicant as hardworking, another 
describes him/her as a self-starter, but a third reference describes the applicant as 
unfocused. The personal manager then has the difficult duty of evaluating this 
information in an effort to hire a good employee. After mulling over the entire applicant 
ftle, the personal manager bases his/her decision on the two positive references, perhaps 
ignoring the negative reference. She/he decides to offer the applicant a job. On a daily 
basis, personnel managers evaluate inconsistent information concerning job candidates. 
The present research seeks to understand how individuals (e.g., personnel managers) 
handle inconsistencies in their beliefs and its effect on attitude change. 
Self-Generated Attitude Change 
In his model of self-generated attitude change, Tesser (1978) posits two functional 
relationships. First, attitudes are a function of beliefs. Beliefs are cognitions about 
persons, objects, or events. Attitudes are the affective outcomes of our beliefs (McGuire, 
1985). One's attitude depends upon one's beliefs about that person, object, or event. 
That is, feelings about attitude objects rely upon the ideas about those attitude objects. 
Second, beliefs dynamically change during thought (Tesser, 1978). These 
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changes are guided by an evaluative consistency principle. In general, beliefs become 
increasingly consistent and less ambivalent as a whole during thought (Leone, Taylor, & 
Adams, 1991 ). If attitudes are products of beliefs and beliefs become less ambivalent and 
more consistent with thought, then attitude polarization should occur with thought. 
Attitude polarization is a more extreme evaluation of an attitude object in the direction of 
an individual's initial attitude. This relationship between attitudes, beliefs, and thought 
has been confrrmed in many studies (see Tesser, 1978, for a review). 
Attitude polarization is not the necessary result of extended thought. The 
presence of a stimulus can create a reality constraint that restricts the use of schemas and 
produces less polarization (Leone et al., 1991; Tesser, 1978). Leone et al. (1991) had 
participants think about their impression while providing a reality constraint restricting 
their beliefs (i.e., the visual presence of the person description). When comparing 
opinions to an objective reality, persons may discover that their beliefs do not match the 
objective reality. The presence of the reality constraint attenuated the effect of thought 
on attitude polarization. In addition, decreased attitude polarization can be the result of 
process constraints. Thought may illuminate the dubious validity of certain beliefs. 
These constraints prevent individuals from disregarding certain beliefs and focusing on 
consistent beliefs (Tesser, Leone, & Clary, 1978). 
Moreover, attitude polarization is dependent upon well-developed schemas that 
provide a guide for thinking about persons, objects, and events in an evaluative consistent 
way (Chaiken & Yates, 1985). Schemas are generalized structures ofknowledge about 
situations and events (Matlin, 1994). Tesser and Leone (1977) hypothesized that men 
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would posses a well-developed schema for football (not for fashions) and women would 
posses a well-developed schema for fashions (and not football). Consistent with this 
reasoning, the researchers found that males showed significantly more attitude 
polarization than females when asked to think about football, and females showed more 
attitude polarization than males when asked to think about fashions. 
Under certain conditions, an individual's attitude toward a stimulus tends to 
polarize as an individual's opportunity for thought increases. Tesser (1978) hypothesized 
three microprocesses that increase the evaluative consistency of an attitude: generation, 
reinterpretation, and discounting. Specifically, attitude polarization is thought to be the 
result of generating beliefs consistent with one's attitudes, reinterpreting ambiguous 
beliefs so as to be consistent with one's attitudes, and/or discounting beliefs that are 
inconsistent with one's attitudes. Perceivers can generate new cognitions that make the 
present thoughts more evaluatively consistent. Sadler and Tesser (1973) found that 
thought produces more attitude polarization and an increased number of consistent 
thoughts. They had participants list their thoughts about their partners, including 
evaluations about each thought, regardless of whether a partner was liked or disliked. 
The increased opportunity in thought resulted in listing proportionally more thoughts 
consistent with their initial attitudes (Sadler & Tesser, 1973). 
Tesser and Cowen (1977) found evidence to support the reinterpretation 
microprocess. Reinterpretation emphasizes the importance of context, where inconsistent 
beliefs are changed to better match the context of consistent beliefs. After the 
participants made some initial ratings, the researchers had them think for ninety seconds 
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or gave them a distraction task before re-rating the trait adjectives. In addition, an 
ambiguous tracer (trait) or an unambiguous tracer (trait) was included with the list of 
adjectives. Tesser and Cowen (1977) discovered that greater attitude polarization was 
associated with the ambiguous trait than the unambiguous trait. It appears that the 
ambiguous trait was more readily reinterpreted to better fit the context of the original 
attitude. 
Tesser's (1978) discounting hypothesis is the third microprocess. It is the process 
by which the weight or the importance of a cognition declines. Discounting results in a 
functional loss of inconsistent cognitions (Tesser, 1978). Tesser (1978) argued that 
information might decline in importance when found inconsistent with a schema. When 
inconsistent information is discounted, the impact of the consistent information is 
bolstered and thereby produces attitude polarization. Researchers have not demonstrated 
that increased thought leads to discounting. 
Individual Differences 
These microprocesses are not mutually exclusive. Some people may use 
generation, reinterpretation, or discounting, or any combination of the three. Personality 
differences may determine which microprocess is most relevant to the individual. Those 
low in the need for cognition are cognitive misers. They may focus on information 
readily available and are less likely to engage in any elaboration. Leone (1994) found 
that those low in need for cognition tend to generate eva1uatively consistent beliefs with 
increased opportunity for thought. 
Dogmatism has been found to moderate the relationship between thought and 
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attitude polarization (Leone, 1989). Those high in dogmatism tend to compartmentalize 
information and find inconsistent information aversive. Leone et al. (1991) found that 
the presence of reality constraints combined with increased opportunity for thought 
forces dogmatics to assess the validity of their beliefs. Consequently, dogmatics tend to 
polarize less than nondogmatics in the face of reality constraints. 
Another personality factor beyond those previously explored is tolerance of 
ambiguity. Those who are intolerant of ambiguous stimuli tend to see things in black and 
white (MacDonald, 1970). They perceive ambiguous cues as threatening or disturbing. 
This causes the individual to distort or deny the credibility or congruence of the cue. 
Conversely, those who are tolerant of challenging information may perceive ambiguous 
stimuli as desirable (Furnham, 1994). Tolerance of ambiguity as a personality factor may 
distinguish those who readily tend to discount inconsistent information from those who 
embrace it. Specifically, those who are highly intolerant of ambiguous stimuli may 
discount inconsistent information because belief ambiguity is undesirable. If so, their 
beliefs will become more consistent, thus producing more attitude polarization. 
Discounting 
Evidence of discounting has been shown in past impression formation studies (see 
Anderson & Jacobson, 1965). Past research on person memory has investigated the ways 
in which individuals deal with inconsistencies. Individuals are always forming 
impressions of people based on small amounts of information. These impressions 
towards others depend on one's perception of the information one has about them. Many 
times, these initial impressions must be evaluated in the face of inconsistencies. Several 
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researchers (Anderson, 1971; Anderson & Jacobson, 1965; Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Haire 
& Grunes, 1950; Hendrick & Costantini, 1970; Kaplan, 1973) have attempted to fmd the 
effects of inconsistency on impression and attitude formation. 
This research on impression formation and evaluating inconsistent information 
can fall into one of two competing models. The first is Solomon Asch's change-in-
meaning paradigm where words shift meaning from one context to another (Anderson, 
1971; Anderson & Jacobson, 1965). An alternative model is that adjectives keep their 
meaning but they are assigned less weight or importance in the overall impression 
(Anderson, 1971; Hendrick & Costantini, 1970). This may occur because of attention 
decrement (progressive decrease in the attention of a serial list of adjectives) or 
discounting (reduction of influential weight of latter adjectives). Evidence for each 
model can be found in the impression formation literature. 
Anderson and Jacobson (1965) used four different instructional sets to study 
discounting. In the fust condition, participants were told that the traits describing a 
person were all equally important and should be evaluated equally. This instructional set 
discourages trait discounting. In the second condition, participants were told that the 
adjectives of a set may not all be equally valid. With these instructions, participants 
should exhibit any natural discounting tendencies that prevail. In the third and fourth 
conditions, participants were told that one of the adjectives did not actually apply, that 
they should decide which one was inapplicable, and base their impression on the other 
two adjectives. Here, discounting was explicitly promoted and served as a reference 
point for the second condition. The difference between the third condition and the fourth 
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condition was that the former had the participants say aloud which adjective they 
discounted whereas the latter had participants write down the adjective they discounted. 
The results indicated that a small discounting effect did occur in the naturalistic setting 
(the second condition). 
The Present Study 
The present research sought to bridge the gap between the past impression 
formation studies and self-generated attitude change. Past research indicated that the 
generation of attitude congruent beliefs and the reinterpretation of inconsistent beliefs 
result in attitude polarization. Anderson and Jacobson (1965) have already shown that 
discounting can occur in impression formation. However, there has not been a direct 
assessment of discounting and its effect on self-generated attitude change. Anderson and 
Jacobson (1965) assumed that participants discounted inconsistencies when instructed to 
do so. Without incorporating a manipulation check, their results are suspect. 
Calling to mind Tesser' s ( 1978) conjecture that discounting may be a function of 
poor memory retrieval, a recall task as a manipulation check may be enlightening. Petty, 
Priester, and Wegener (1994) maintain that if an attitude is not immediately accessible, a 
person will search their memory for information to construct an attitude. Fiske and 
Taylor (1984) argue that under the guidance of a schema, making a judgement (e.g., 
forming an impression) improves recall of attitude relevant evidence. More importantly, 
information inconsistent with the schema may be attributed to transitory cause and 
summarily discounted (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
Although not a proponent of schema theory, Wyer and Carlston (1994) also make 
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inferences about the mechanics and storage of information. Past research on the 
recollection of traits indicates that trait recall is improved when asked to form an 
impression about persons rather than merely memorizing traits (e.g., Hartwick, 1979). It 
appears that the nature of impression formation tasks shape the encoding and retrieval of 
traits. Wyer and Carlston (1994) speculate that when faced with inconsistency, 
individuals engage in inconsistency resolution (i.e., thought leads to the evaluation of 
inconsistent information which in turn creates stronger retrieval routes). Given more 
time, individuals reexamine the consistent information, which strengthens their initial 
impression. By bolstering the consistent information, individuals may be discounting the 
inconsistent information. 
The present study explored whether inconsistency discounting also contributes to 
thought produced attitude polarization. Tesser (1978) asserts that discounting should 
mediate the relationship between attitude polarization and opportunity for thought. By 
incorporating the instructional sets of Anderson and Jacobson (1965) with a recall task, 
the present research sought to determine if inconsistency discounting was one of the 
processes underlying self-generated attitude change. The hypotheses were as follows: 
1. As opportunity for thought increased, attitude polarization should generally 
increase. 
2. (a) When discounting was difficult, the amount of attitude polarization would 
not vary as the amount of opportunity for thought increased, and (b) when 
discounting was easy, the amount of attitude polarization would increase as 
the amount of opportunity for thought increased. 
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3. Persons with low tolerance for ambiguity were more likely than persons with 
high tolerance for ambiguity to discount inconsistent beliefs and to experience 
thought induced attitude polarization. The difference between high and low 
tolerance for ambiguity would be greater given high opportunity for thought 
rather than low opportunity for thought, and greater when discounting was 
easier rather than harder. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 114 university students (83 females, 31 males, mean age= 25.9 years) 
enrolled in psychology classes at a mid-sized Southeastern university volunteered to 
participate in an experiment entitled "Judging Job Applicants." Participants received 
extra credit in exchange for their participation. Informed consent forms were obtained 
before participation and all participants were treated according to the American 
Psychological Association ethical standards. 
Materials 
Using Anderson's (1968) trait likableness ratings, 33 positive traits (high in 
likability), and 33 negative traits (low in likability) were selected. Twenty-two "applicant 
ftles" were created by combining two consistent traits with an inconsistent trait. These 
trait sets acted as filler files to acclimate the participant to use the impression rating scale. 
Eleven trait sets contained one positive trait and two negative traits. Another eleven trait 
sets contained one negative trait and two positive traits. Each applicant file was printed 
on a hypothetical company's letterhead. These files were designed to display an 
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applicant's number (generated by a random numbers table) and a listing of three 
references (identified as numbers 1, 2, and 3). Across from each reference, a trait was 
printed in capitals and in bold lettering. The three traits per file were ordered vertically 
with the inconsistent trait randomly inserted within the two consistent traits. The 
combinations of three traits were designed so that each positive file was equal in 
likability and each negative file was equal in dislikablility. 
In addition to these 22 filler flles, eight target sets of traits were printed on 
applicant files. These trait sets were modified versions of the original trait sets from the 
Anderson and Jacobson (1965) study. The frrst four sets included two positive words 
followed by one negative word that was the semantic opposite of the preceding word. 
The four sets of traits were: considerate, honest, deceitful; artistic, careful, reckless; 
appreciative, cheerful, gloomy; and respectful, purposeful, aimless. Four additional sets 
of two negative words followed by a positive antonym of the second word were included. 
They were: close-minded, careless, dependable; unforgiving, impolite, courteous; 
conceited, insecure, self-confident; and stingy, boring, amusing. 
Last, the AT-20 Scale originally developed by Rydell & Rosen (1966, as cited in 
MacDonald, 1970), but revised by MacDonald (1970), comprised the ''thought process" 
questionnaire given to participants. This scale measures one's tolerance for ambiguity. It 
consisted of twenty true-or-false items. Answers were scored such that high scores 
indicate high intolerance for ambiguity. Participants were categorized as either having 
high tolerance for ambiguity or low tolerance for ambiguity by median-split procedures. 
MacDonald reported a test-retest reliability of .63 (p<.Ol) for a six-month interval and an 
internal consistency estimate of0.86. 
Design 
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The proposed study was a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects factorial design. The 
independent variables were instructional set (Instruction 1 or Instruction 2) and levels of 
opportunity for thought (15 or 60 sec). Opportunity for thought and condition type for 
each participant was determined by random assignment. In addition, a predictor variable 
of personality type (high or low tolerance of ambiguity) was included. The dependent 
variables were attitude change and discounting. 
Procedyr~ 
Participants were individually greeted and seated by the experimenter. They were 
told that they will be judging job applicants based on information from letters of 
recommendation. A cover story explaining the importance of letters of recommendation 
in the application process was used to motivate the participants. They were also told that 
they will complete a thought process scale that measures their cognitive style. Last, 
participants were told that their participation is completely voluntary, they can withdraw 
at any time without penalty, and that their name will not be associated with any part of 
the research. Informed consent forms were signed and dated, then placed in a secure 
location. 
Participants were told that in order to judge the applicants, they will be using an 
impression scale. The experimenter then illustrated the use of a 15-point Likert scale 
with endpoints labeled +7 (extremely favorable impression) and -7 (extremely 
unfavorable impression), intermediate points labeled +4/-4 (moderate), and a midpoint of 
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0 (neutral). Hypothetical examples of positive and negative impressions were given. The 
impression scale was placed within full view throughout the experiment. 
The experimenter shuffled the thirty applicant files to ensure randomization. 
Participants were told that they will be asked to role play the part of a personnel manager; 
the personnel department has sifted through all three letters per applicant and has 
summarized their qualities into one standard form. Participants read these descriptions 
and rated their initial impression according to the scale. They were given only a few 
seconds (approximately 1 0 seconds) to give their initial rating aloud. Participants were 
instructed to ask the experimenter to clarify any unclear words. Any questions were 
answered. 
Each file was presented individually with the impression scale in full view. After 
each presentation, the ratings were recorded on a coding sheet. From the eight target 
ftles, one was randomly selected with a +4 rating (or +3 if there are no +4) and one was 
randomly selected with a -4 rating (or -3 ifthere are no -4 ratings). Participants were 
then given one of two instructional sets: 
[Instruction 1] Imagine that three people have each written a letter of 
reference describing the job candidate. We suminarized each letter of 
reference into one word. These people all know the candidate well, and 
each word is equally important in describing the job candidate. 
Sometimes, of course, the three words may seem inconsistent. That's to 
be expected because each of the people might see a different part of the 
candidate's personality. However, all three words are accurate and each 
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word is equally important. You should pay equal attention to each of the 
three. Sometimes this may seem hard, but just act naturally and do the 
best you can (modified from Anderson & Jacobson, 1965). 
[Instruction 2] Imagine that three people have each written a letter of 
reference describing the job candidate. We summarized each letter of 
reference into one word. These people all know the candidate well. 
However, these people might not all be equally good judges of 
personality. Consequently, the three words might not be equally important 
aspects of the job candidate's personality. In order to decide what the 
candidate is really like, you might have to pay more attention to one word 
than another, at least in some cases. Sometimes this may seem hard, but 
just act naturally and do the best you can (modified from Anderson & 
Jacobson, 1965). 
All the participants were then told: 
There are a couple of persons that we are particularly interested in. I'd like 
you to take some time to think about one of these applicant flles. I want 
you to concentrate all your thoughts on this applicant during the time I 
give you. You might want to think about how you feel about a person 
with these characteristics. Or you might want to think about what other 
qualities and traits people like this may have. Just concentrate on this 
description and continue thinking until I tell you to stop. 
Participants were then shown one of two target files about which they were asked to 
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think. The order of the two description files (i.e., positive initial rating, followed by 
negative initial rating; negative initial rating, followed by positive initial rating) was 
counterbalanced between participants to equate order effects. The participant was given 
the target files to read for approximately five seconds. Then the file was removed from 
view. Each participant received the same duration of time for thought (15 sec or 60 sec) 
for both descriptions. When the allotted time for thought expires, participants were told: 
Now that you've had some time to collect your thoughts, I'd like you to 
once again indicate how you feel. Sometimes people's feelings change 
even in a short period of time such as this. Of course, you may or may not 
feel the same way about this person. Using the scale like before, indicate 
how you feel now about the person. 
Using the same impression scale as before, participants indicated their overall impression 
rating. Their second ratings were recorded on the coding sheet. The process was 
repeated for the second target flle. 
After the two re-ratings were complete, participants were asked to recall the three 
traits listed in the first applicant flle about which they thought. In order to assist with this 
process, a participant was given an applicant flle that contains blank lines where the traits 
were formally located. After writing in the remembered traits, the participants were 
asked to recall the second applicant file about which they thought. Participants were 
given another blank applicant file to complete. 
After the two recall forms were completed, the participants were asked to 
complete a 20-item questionnaire. This included demographic information (age and sex) 
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and the AT-20 tolerance of ambiguity scale. 
Finally, with the experiment concluded, the experimenter inquired of the 
participant what the intention of the study may be. The hypotheses and purpose of the 
experiment was explained. Participants were asked not to discuss the study with potential 
participants; they were thanked and dismissed. 
Dependent Measures 
Attitude Change. Attitude change was scored using a trichotomous coding 
system. If initial attitudes became more polarized (i.e., if initially positive attitudes 
became more positive or initially negative attitudes became more negative), then attitude 
change was scored a + 1. If the opposite occurred (initially positive attitudes became less 
positive or initially negative attitudes became less negative), then attitude change was 
scored a -1. Ifthere was no change, attitude change was scored a 0. Scores were 
summed from the two target cards to give a range of -2 to +2 as an index of attitude 
change. The attitude scale here was designed to assess whether or not attitude change 
occurred rather than the magnitude of attitude change (see Tesser, 1978, for details on 
attitude change indices). 
Discounting. A total discounting score was computed by summing the number of 
inconsistent traits recalled from each description so that each participant received a single 
discounting score. The lower the discounting score, the less evidence for discounting. 
The scores ranged from a 2 (participants recalled both inconsistent traits) to a 4 
(participants did not recall either of the inconsistent traits). A participant who recalled 
both of the inconsistent traits in the two descriptions did not discount any traits. Note 
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that the higher the discounting score, the stronger evidence for discounting. That is, a 
participant who did not recall any traits expressed a strong tendency toward discounting. 
Results 
Attitude polarization 
The main hypothesis of this research was that attitudes about persons should 
polarize as the opportunity for thought increased. A main effect for opportunity for 
thought was expected. It was also hypothesized that an instructional set that made 
discounting inconsistent information easier would increase attitude polarization whereas 
an instructional set that made discounting difficult would decrease attitude polarization. 
An interaction between opportunity for thought and instructional set was expected. Last, 
it was hypothesized that persons with low tolerance for ambiguity would experience 
attitude polarization when given ample opportunity for thought. In contrast, persons with 
high tolerance would experience less attitude polarization when given insufficient 
opportunity for thought. Moreover, persons with low tolerance for ambiguity would 
experience attitude polarization when discounting was easier. Persons with high 
tolerance for ambiguity would experience attitude polarization when discounting was 
difficult. An interaction between opportunity for thought, instructional set, and the 
personality variable of tolerance of ambiguity was expected. 
A 2 (opportunity for thought) x 2 (instructional set) x 2 (personality type) ANOV A 
with attitude change as the dependent variable was conducted. As expected, there was a 
significant main effect for opportunity for thought, E (1, 106) = 4.70, p ~ 0.05. When the 
opportunity for thought was low, attitude polarization was less likely (M = -0.45, SD = 
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1.09). When the opportunity for thought was high, attitude polarization was more likely 
(M = 0.03, SD = 1.07). However, none of the other main effects or interactions were 
significant, all.Es (1, 106) < 1, J2S = ns. Although the results replicated previous research 
on self-generated attitude change, the additional hypotheses were not supported. 
Discounting 
It was hypothesized that there would be less inconsistent trait recall when the 
opportunity for thought was high and more inconsistent trait recall when opportunity for 
thought was low. A main effect of opportunity for thought on inconsistent trait recall was 
expected. It was also hypothesized that an instructional set that made discounting 
inconsistent information easier would decrease trait recall whereas an instructional set 
that made discounting difficult would increase trait recall. An interaction between 
opportunity for thought and instructional set was expected. Last, it was hypothesized that 
persons with low tolerance for ambiguity would experience less trait recall when given 
ample opportunity for thought. In contrast, persons with high tolerance for ambiguity 
would experience more trait recall when given insufficient opportunity for thought. 
Further, persons with low tolerance for ambiguity would experience less inconsistent trait 
recall when discounting was easier. Persons with high tolerance for ambiguity would 
experience more inconsistent trait recall when discounting was difficult. An interaction 
between opportunity for thought, instructional set, and the personality variable of 
tolerance of ambiguity was expected. 
A 2 (opportunity for thought) x 2 (instructional set) x 2 (personality type) ANOV A 
with trait recall as the dependent variable was conducted. However, none of the main 
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effects or interactions were significant, all.Es (1, 106).:::; 2.16, J2S.:::; 0.15. These results 
suggested that trait recall was not affected by varying levels of opportunity for thought, 
instructional sets, or tolerance of ambiguity. 
Discussion 
The present study sought to identify the role of inconsistent belief discounting in 
self-generated attitude change. The theory of self-generated attitude change, developed 
by Tesser (1978), asserts that individuals hold beliefs about persons, objects, or events. 
One's attitude about persons, objects, and events depends on one's beliefs about those 
persons, objects, or events. With thought,.the beliefs become more consistent and less 
ambivalent thus resulting in attitude polarization (i.e., feelings become less ambivalent 
and more extreme). The results reported in this study replicated prior research that 
demonstrated this relationship between attitude polarization and opportunity for thought. 
Theoretically, one of the cognitive processes that mediates the relationship between 
attitude polarization and opportunity for thought is discounting inconsistent information. 
Unfortunately, the role that discounting plays in self-generated attitude change was not 
illuminated in this research. The results indicated that attitude polarization was not more 
likely when opportunity for thought was high and when discounting inconsistent 
information was easy. Moreover, this effect was not more likely for persons who are 
intolerant of ambiguous information than for persons who are tolerant of ambiguity. In 
addition, increased amount of thought did not result in less inconsistent trait recall. 
Inconsistent trait recall was not more likely when discounting was easier or when persons 
are intolerant of ambiguous information. Why were the hypotheses not supported? 
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Possible Explanations 
One explanation might have been that the instructional sets designed to make 
discounting inconsistent information easier or harder may not have been a strong enough 
manipulation to elicit discounting. The participants may have opted to ignore the 
instructional sets and decide for themselves how they were going to evaluate the 
inconsistent information. Instead, these instructions may have inadvertently prompted 
other kinds of thought processes. Specifically, attitude polarization may have been the 
result of the spontaneous generation of additional beliefs that were consistent with the 
subjects' first impressions. Alternatively, attitude polarization may have been the result 
of the reinterpretation of the inconsistent information to make it more consistent with the 
initial beliefs upon which subjects based their first impressions. 
However, past research on impression formation (see Anderson & Jacobson, 1965) 
has found a small discounting event using the similar instructional sets. Speziani and 
Leone (1999) incorporated the instructional sets and found a small relationship between 
attitude polarization and thought. Future research should not abandon the use of these 
instructional sets. Perhaps some changes can be made to increase the impact the 
instructional sets have on attitude change. 
It is also possible that the discounting effect did not occur because the descriptive 
traits and their semantic opposites produced two very divergent thoughts about a person. 
It may have forced participants to dismiss both pieces of incongruent information and 
focus on only the remaining descriptive trait. However, the traits used here were also 
used in past studies on discounting which found that individuals discounted inconsistent 
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traits in impression formation tasks (Anderson & Jacobson, 1965). Moreover, Speziani 
& Leone (1999) found that the use of instructional sets that make discounting easy in 
conjunction with increased thought resulted in attitude polarization. 
The previous research on the microprocesses of reinterpretation of cognitions and 
generation of new beliefs used moderate time lengths (e.g., 90 seconds) for an effect on 
attitude polarization. Discounting may require longer periods of time because it may not 
be the most favored approach to evaluating inconsistencies. It may require longer 
thought times to evaluate the information and properly dismis·s it from memory. 
However, a small discounting effect was reported using the same time lengths used in 
this investigation (Speziani & Leone, 1999). 
Some other alternative explanations for the nonsignificant results include sample 
specific error. The vast majority of the sample included upperclassman students studying 
social psychology or personality theories. The exposure to advanced theories of 
psychology may have biased the sample to be unusually curious or suspicious about the 
expected results of the experiment. The participants may have been too preoccupied with 
the use of semantic opposites to focus on their impressions during thought. Moreover, 
the upperclassmen may have highly accurate memory skills so that the use of trait recall 
was not powerful enough to detect differences in the way individuals discount 
inconsistent information. However, other studies on self-generated attitude change used 
similar samples and found evidence of thought-induced attitude polarization (Speziani & 
Leone, 1999; see also Leone, 1989~ 1994, 1996; Leone et al., 1991). 
It was hypothesized that individuals with low tolerance for ambiguity would be 
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more likely to discount inconsistent information when the time provided for thought was 
longer rather than shorter. The results did not support this hypothesis. The scale 
developed by MacDonald (1970) is psychometrically sound, with good internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability. Moreover, there is some evidence linking 
intolerance of ambiguity and self-generated attitude change (Leone, personal 
communication, July 30, 1999). 
Future Directions 
There are several possible explanations for the null results that can be eliminated, 
but some improvements can still be incorporated in future research. Inconsistent trait 
recall is one possible way of directly assessing discounting. Tesser (1978) speculated 
that discounting might be a function of poor memory retrieval. Moreover, the recall of 
attitude relevant evidence is improved when forming an impression (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). Hence, inconsistent traits may be discounted. Other investigations can utilize 
different ways of assessing discounting. A thought-listing task could assess the amount 
of weight or importance a person places on inconsistent traits. 
Tolerance of ambiguity is only one personality factor that might moderate the 
relationship between attitude polarization and thought. Dogmatism, rigidity, and 
personal need for structure also accentuate the relationship between discounting and 
thought. Additional research is needed to determine what part, if any, personality plays 
in discounting inconsistent beliefs during self-generated attitude change. More 
importantly, the effect per se of discounting on self-generated attitude change should be 
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demonstrated. Further research needs to provide additional insight into the cognitive 
processes behind self-generated attitude change. 
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